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Executive summary 
This paper examines the relationship between the extent of goodwill impairment and the 
properties of CEOs and CFOs of a selection of FTSE Eurotop 100 Index companies. Prior 
research indicated that it is likely that CEOs tend to take earnings baths early in their 
tenure, as the losses can then still easily be blamed on their predecessors, as well as 
creating a lower benchmark for measuring their own future financial performance. Also, 
the nature of a specific turnover process and the prior employment of the incoming CEO 
(hired from within or outside the company) have been considered as an explanatory 
variable by some studies. The outcomes of this study indicate that the tenure and prior 
employment of the CEO are significantly associated with a company’s financial reporting 
behavior in relation to the magnitude of goodwill impairment. However, contrary to 
expectations, goodwill impairment charges are likely to increase as the tenure of a CEO 
increases. CEOs promoted from inside the same company are likely to impair goodwill by 
larger amounts, compared to CEOs hired from outside the company. A significant 
association between the CFO tenure and prior employment variables and the magnitude of 
impairment charges was not established in this study.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5550. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to asses the extent of goodwill impairment by European 
companies for the period 2006-2007, and to investigate the relationship between the 
extent of goodwill impairment and the properties of executives in charge at the time. 
 
The commonly used opportunistic perspective of the Positive Accounting Theory predicts 
that when self-interested actors are confronted with opportunities to use discretion with 
                                             
1 This thesis was supervised by Drs. C.D. Knoops. Olga Viśnevskaá has graduated from the Erasmus School of 
Economics and is currently in completing her masters thesis on the topic of financial law at the Rotterdam 
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regard to financial accounting and reporting to their own advantage, they will do so. This 
practice of ‘earnings management’ could be aimed at either increasing the reported 
income, or decreasing it through income smoothing and taking of earnings baths. The 
International Financial Reporting Standards are often criticized for allowing room for 
discretion especially due to the prescription of use of fair values. More specifically, the 
accounting treatment of goodwill through the use of impairment tests is often criticized. 
My own examination of the financial reporting standards revealed that indeed, in my 
opinion, there was room for managerial discretion with respect to goodwill (re)valuation 
and possible losses arising from it. Accordingly, I expect executives to use goodwill 
impairment charges to manage earnings to achieve personal goals. As I wonder whether 
personal goals could be related to the phase of employment of an executive, I formulate 
the following research question: 
 
Are tenure and prior employment of the CEO and the CFO associated with a 
company’s financial reporting behavior in relation to the magnitude of 
goodwill impairment? 
 
Considering the prior research mentioned further in this master thesis, this study mainly 
builds and expands on the work conducted by Masters-Stout e.a. 2007. My study adds value 
to the existing body of research for the following reasons: 
• Firstly, contrary to most studies mentioned in this master thesis, as well as that by 
Masters-Stout, this study is conducted using data of European companies that are 
subject to IFRS and not SFAS. The outcomes can thus be considered more relevant in 
the European context; 
• Secondly, as far as my knowledge goes, no other study has been conducted on the 
relationship between the CFO tenure and prior employment and a company’s financial 
reporting behavior regarding the magnitude of goodwill impairment; 
• Finally, as far as I know, no other study has combined and offset both CEO and CFO 
properties in relation to goodwill impairment, in one research design. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, I will describe the theoretical 
background to my study and review the outcomes of prior research on the subject. 
Continuingly, I will introduce the hypotheses that were tested and follow with a brief 
description of the sample used in my study. I will then describe the research design and 
the corresponding model and continue with the elaboration of the results. Before I 
conclude this article, I will reflect on the outcomes of my study and give suggestions for 
further research. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and prior literature 
2.1  Earnings management and financial reporting incentives 
The practice of managers trying to influence the financial reporting numbers and the way 
they appear in the financial statements is often known by the term ‘earnings 
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management’. Several incentives to manage earnings can be identified, for 
example (Palepu e.a., 2007): 
1. accounting-based debt covenants: requirement of certain debt-contracts and 
meeting targets arising from them, can induce managers to distort accounting 
figures to gain more favorable results; 
2. management compensation: (bonus-)compensation  which are often connected to 
reported profits and wanting to secure their position for longer period of time, is 
another motivation to favorably influence the reported income; 
3. corporate control contests: managers can use accounting numbers to gain approval 
of company’s shareholders in their attempt to become/remain a manager. 
 
There are several ways for managers to influence financial reporting, one of which is asset 
distortion. When managers desire to increase reported earnings they tend to overstate 
assets, as this is accompanied by either an increase in income or a reduction of costs in the 
income statement. On the other hand, managers can also desire to deflate earnings by 
understating assets. Managers can ‘smooth income’ by overstating expenses during a 
period of exceptional performance by the company. Also managers can ‘take a bath’ in 
income by overstating expenses during a period of exceptionally bad performance to 
create an appearance of a turnaround in the following years (Palepu e.a., 2007). Thus, 
managers are not necessarily interested in presenting accounting figures only ‘for the 
better’ as earnings baths occur as well. 
 
2.2 Discretionary financial reporting and the case of goodwill 
The first step in the examination of prior research concentrated on the studies of the 
relationship between opportunistic behaviour and goodwill impairment testing. Prior 
research showed evidence of opportunistic behavior on the account of managers with 
regard to impairment testing of goodwill as the prescribed accounting treatment. The 
findings were, however, not uniform. Some researchers (Anantharaman 2007, Henning and 
Shaw 2004) found little support for the criticism of goodwill impairment testing, which was 
introduced as the new accounting treatment of goodwill in SFAS 142 and IAS 36. To the 
contrary, other studies have shown evidence of the misuse of managerial discretion to 
some degree under the new accounting standards (Beatty and Weber 2005, Lapointe 2005, 
Zang 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2007, Carlin e.a. 2007). 
 
2.3 Management tenure: the role of the chief executive officer 
Like any process, the period of tenure of the chief executive officer (CEO) can be divided 
into different phases. The agency theory predicts that managers are guided by self-
interest. Presumably, different phases of tenure will correspond with different goals and 
motivations. And so, the second step of the literature examination was aimed at examining 
the relationship between the executive management’s phase of employment and its 
influence on financial reporting. 
 
Moore (1973) conducted one of the first studies on the subject of the influence of 
management changes in the field of accounting. He found that in the year of a top 
management change, income reducing discretionary accounting decisions, such as write-
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downs, write-offs and taking of provisions, occurred significantly more than in years with 
no management change. He interpreted the overall results to be an indication of the newly 
appointed management taking an earnings bath. More so, because the majority of 
companies with indication of income-reducing discretionary accounting decision did report 
an increase in income in the first reporting year after the change. Accordingly, Moore 
hypothesized that the incentives of the incoming management for taking the income 
reducing discretionary decisions are two-fold. First, the blame would be placed on their 
predecessors and the historical benchmark for their own future performance is reduced. 
Second, the losses taken in the year of the change would not have to be reported in the 
future, thus increasing the future reported income and the appearance of their 
performance. 
 
Later, DeAngelo (1987) found that when a ‘dissident’ (an outside manager) was hired, he 
would report an ‘immediate earnings bath’, so to be able to report an earnings turn-
around in the following years. Pourciau (1993) investigated the behavior of incoming 
managers in cases of what she called a non-routine (involuntary) executive change. She 
found that for these instances the incoming executives managed accruals in the year of the 
change to reduce income, and did the opposite in the following year. Additionally, in the 
year of the change, larger write-off were taken. Francis e.a. (1996) conducted a broad 
study of possible causes of discretionary write-offs. Among others, she found that write-
offs occur more frequently if preceded by a management change, and are then also larger 
in size. 
 
Several studies, which did not directly investigate the relationship between executive 
tenure and goodwill impairment, did produce outcomes on this subject as well. Like Beatty 
and Weber (2005), who hypothesized that the difference between actual and predicted 
goodwill write-offs could be explained by the departure of the CEO who made the original 
acquisition decision. Further, the study by Lapointe (2005) also found that higher 
transitional goodwill impairment losses correlated with companies having experienced 
recent management change. Additionally Ramanna and Watts (2007) found that goodwill-
write offs are negatively associated with CEO tenure. Finally, Zang (2008) found that 
recent management change was an explanatory variable for earnings management through 
transitional goodwill impairment losses2, as he believed that higher goodwill impairment 
losses were taken during the transitional period to increase the likelihood of higher 
earnings in the future. 
 
Bengtsson e.a. (2007) investigated the occurrence of earnings management in Sweden, 
surrounding management turnovers through both accruals, as well as write-offs. Earnings 
were reduced in the first year of the turnover and increased in the following year. This 
supports the findings in the previously mentioned studies. Furthermore, Bengtsson 
attempted to distinguish an association between earnings management and an executive 
turnover in question, being routine versus non-routine. However, he found no conclusive 
evidence in support of this distinction. 
                                             
2 Loss incurred by companies upon the adoption of the new SFAS. 142 standard. 
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Masters-Stout e.a. (2007) performed a subsequent study, which related goodwill 
impairments under SFAS 142 to CEO tenure. For the companies that did impair, she found 
that newly appointed CEOs reported higher impairments than senior CEOs.’ Her additional 
findings indicated that CEOs hired internally from within the present employees of the 
company impaired relatively smaller amounts. She hypothesized that these CEOs were 
more ‘personally invested’ in previously taken strategic acquisition decisions and thus 
lacked what she called a ‘fresh perspective’. These outcomes were however insignificant. 
 
2.4  Management tenure: the role of the chief financial officer 
From the previous step of my prior research analysis it became clear that scholars 
hypothesize that CEOs have certain incentives to manipulate financial reporting, have the 
power to do so, and use their power to act on their incentives. In the continuing step I 
attempt to consider the role of another senior manager, which could be presumed to 
influence the financial reporting of a company: the chief financial officer (CFO). 
 
The role of the modern CFO is no longer limited to mere ‘financial record keeping’. Now, 
the CFO ‘is one of the top decision makers – often leading member of the top management 
along with the chief executive officer and the chief operating officer.’ (Copeland, 2001). A 
CFO today, is involved in decision-making on many levels and about many significant issues 
throughout the entire company. Intuitively, it can be supposed that some incentives that 
drive CEOs, might similarly drive CFOs. If so, the agency theory predicts that the CFO will 
also try to exert influence to satisfy his self-interests. Surprisingly, very few studies have 
been conducted on the influence of the CFO in the field of accounting research. Could it 
be more commonsense to consider the CFO to have more influence on financial reporting? 
More than the CEO? 
 
Building on that intuition, Jiang and Petroni (2008) were interested in finding the answer 
to the question of ‘who has the most influence on earnings management’, the CEO or the 
CFO. They executed three previously conducted studies, which already established an 
association between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management, and reexamined 
them by also testing the association between the CFOs’ equity incentives and earnings 
management. The general outcomes indicated that the amount of discretionary accruals 
was more closely associated with the CFO rather then with the CEO incentives and that the 
role of a CFO is indeed influential with regard to a company’s financial reporting behavior. 
 
Greiger and North (2006) also suspected that the CFO ‘has a substantial amount of control 
over a company’s reported financial status’, as they studied the effect of a CFO change on 
reported accruals. They found that after an appointment of a new CFO, earnings are 
significantly reduced through the management of accruals. Furthermore, these findings did 
not seem to be influenced or mitigated by the appointment of a new CEO. Finally, they 
also found that the hiring of a CFO from a different source than the company’s direct audit 
company, produced more significant outcomes. 
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3. Hypothesis development 
Based on these outcomes of prior research and the predictions of the positive accounting 
theory I have arrived at the following hypotheses to be tested in my study: 
 
H1: Shorter CEO tenure corresponds with higher goodwill impairment charges. 
H2: Companies with CEOs, who have been employed by the same company two 
years or less, will take relatively higher goodwill impairment losses. 
 
Additionally, I have asked myself whether the logic that has been applied to the 
relationship between properties of a CEO of a company and its financial reporting 
behavior, could also be applied to the properties of the CFO. Combined with the outcomes 
of studies regarding the CEO properties mentioned above I arrive at the following 
additional hypotheses: 
 
H3: Shorter CFO tenure corresponds with higher goodwill impairment charges. 
H4: Companies with CFOs, who have been employed by the same company two 
years or less, will take relatively higher goodwill impairment losses. 
 
 
4. Sample and data collection 
My study examined the financial data of 58 major European companies listed in the FTSE 
Eurotop 100 Index during the period 2006-2007, resulting in 116 observations. In 37% of the 
cases, goodwill impairments were observed. Largest average absolute and relative 
(measured against revenues) impairment losses were observed in the telecommunications 
industry. The average CEO tenure for companies within the sample was 5.9 years; the 
average CFO tenure was 4.5 years. Additionally, 67% of the CEOs in the sample, prior to 
their appointment, were employed by the same company for less than three years, which 
classified them as ‘internal hires’ for the purpose of my study. 54% of the CFOs were 
classified as internal hires. When examining the subsample of companies that that have 
taken a decision to impair goodwill, the frequency of the impairment decision decreased 
as observed tenures of CEOs increased. A similar pattern was observed between the 
frequency of impairment decisions and CFO tenure. 
 
The financial data was hand collected using the information provided in the annual 
reports. Information regarding the tenure and prior employment of the executives was 
hand-collected for each executive from additional sources like company websites and 
newspaper articles, as a general database for such information of European companies 
does not exist. 
 
 
5. Research design and model 
To test my hypotheses I used a multivariate regression model, which I will describe in this 
section. 
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The dependent variable of this model (IMPit) is the reported goodwill impairment charge. 
First, the effects of the independent variables were measured against the reported nominal 
impairment amount. Secondly, I believed that there would be added value to measuring the 
dependent variable relative to the effect this has within the entire income statement of a the 
specific company, as this puts the impairment charge amount into perspective. This is why, 
the alternative dependent variable metric is the impairment loss divided by the revenue. 
 
To test my hypothesis I added several independent variables of interest. To test H1 and H3, I 
departed from Master-Stout e.a. (2007), who used dummy variables to distinguish between 
the new and old executives , as I do not find their arguments to be substantial enough to 
justify the separation into those specific categories. Using a continuous metric would, as I 
believed, provide for a test of a more nuanced relationship between the dependent variable 
and this independent variable of tenure. Furthermore, other studies that have used executive 
tenure as an independent variable (e.g. Ramanna, Watts, 2007), have also used a 
continuous metric. Consequently, to test the effect of executive tenure, I use the tenure 
duration measured in years (CEO_TENUREit and CFO_TENUREit). In line with the 
hypotheses I have formulated, I expected there to be a negative association between these 
variables and the dependent variable. 
 
To test H2 and H4 I added dummy-variables into the model (CEO_INTERNALit, 
CFO_INTERNALit). These dummy variables made it possible to test for the difference in the 
impact of an executive prior employment on the (relative) size of the impairment charge. The 
dummy variable was coded 0 and is considered to be an external-hire, if the executive in 
question was employed by company i for less than three years before appointment as an 
executive officer. In the other case the variable was coded 1. I based this distinction on 
Master-Stout e.a. (2007), as it seems reasonable to consider an executive who has been 
with a company for less than three years not to be entrenched. In line with the hypotheses I 
have formulated, I expected there to be a negative association between these variables and 
the dependent variable. 
 
Additionally, I included several control variables associated with the economic condition of 
the companies. I used EBITDA (EBITDAit) to control for the size of the economic activity of a 
company. I saw the EBITDA amount as the measure of the ability of a company to absorb 
impairment charges. I did not hypothesize a coefficient sign, as, on one hand, I can imagine 
that higher EBITDA can be seen by the management as buffer that can absorbed ‘unwanted’ 
expenses and smooth income. On the other hand, lower (than expected) EBITDA could also 
induce an earnings bath strategy. 
 
Further, I included the after tax net income (INCOMEit), which is also used by Masters-Stout 
e.a. (2007), as a measure of economic performance (profitability) of the companies in the 
sample. This variable is included in the model to account for the overall profitability of a 
company. Although net income already includes any impairment losses, I presumed that if a 
company is confronted with a negative or extremely low or high net income before the 
publication of final financial results, the management might feel tempted to adjust the 
reported impairment charge. Consequently, similar pattern that I described for the EBITDA 
can also be applied to the relationship between the net income and the goodwill impairment 
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charge: high profits could induce income smoothing and losses can be seen as an 
opportunity to take (further) earnings baths. Thus, no coefficient sign was hypothesized 
either. 
 
The size of a company (SIZEit) measured as the natural logarithm of company’s total assets 
to normalize the impact of the part of the sample on the larger side of the spectrum, was 
included in the model as well. I predicted a positive relationship between the size of a 
company and the amount of the impairment charge, which is also supported by 
Van de Poel e.a. (2008) outcomes. It seems to me that, as larger companies are often the 
product of several prior mergers, this would result in more recognized goodwill that in turn 
can be a subject to impairment. 
 
Finally, I included a company’s leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by the total 
assets, as control variable. I expected highly leveraged companies to be subjected to more 
attention and scrutiny by their creditors (who are professional investors), and these 
companies to operate under bigger restrictions of loan contracts. This should in turn reduce 
the amount of earnings management in general. And when earnings management would 
take place, it would probably be directed upwards to increase reported earnings. For this 
reasons I expected a negative coefficient sign for this variable. This variable can be 
considered a proxy for room for discretionary earnings management by a company as was 
used by Zang (2008). 
 
Hence, my empirical model looks as follows: 
 
I tested this model using the data from the entire sample, as well as performing separate 
tests on the data from the subsample of companies that impaired goodwill during the 
observed period. Furthermore, I used two different definitions of the independent variable 
IMP (measured in absolute and in relative values), and also of the independent variable 
CEO_TENURE (measured in years and as a natural logarithm). This has resulted in different 
outcomes. Secondly, I executed three types of regression with regard to the executive 
properties data. First, I applied the abovementioned model, removing the CFO variables 
and accounting only for the CEO properties, to measure the ‘pure’ association between IMP 
and CEO tenure and prior employment. After that, I did the same now removing the CEO 
tenure and prior employment properties, to measure the ‘CFO effect’. Thirdly, I tested my 
main model, mentioned above, which controlled the associations between impairment 
charges and one executive type tenure and prior employment, for that of the other.  
 
 
6. Results 
6.1 CEO properties 
The outcomes regarding the independent variables of interest, the CEO properties, are 
consistent in all cases. However, they are entirely not as expected. CEO tenure is 
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positively associated with impairment charges. Furthermore, compared to CEOs hired from 
outside the company, CEOs hired from inside the company are associated with higher 
impairment charges. These associations are significant at α<.05 for both the entire sample 
and the subsample, when tenure is expressed as a logarithm. When tenure is expressed in 
years, measuring impairment relative to revenues, gives slightly better significance results. 
Overall, these finding indicate that H1 and H2 of my research design are false. These 
findings are summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 3 Regression outcomes CEO properties 
6.2 CFO properties 
The coefficients of the independent variables of interest were insignificant at α<.05 for all 
tests performed on the data from the entire sample. Within the subsample, the association 
between prior employment of the CFO and the magnitude of impairment charges is 
significant. For this population, compared to CFOs hired from outside the company, CFOs 
hired from inside the company are associated with relatively higher impairment charges, 
contrary to expectations. As such, the validity of H3 and H4 was not established for the 
entire sample, and validity of H3 was not established for the subsample either. H4 was 
proven to be significantly false for the data of the subsample. These findings are 
summarized in table 2. 
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Table 4 Regression outcomes CFO properties 
 
6.3 Combined model 
With respect to independent variables of interest, several associations become clear. The 
association between the CEO tenure and the magnitude of impairment charges is 
significant at α<.05 in all cases, except for the test of the subsample using the absolute 
values of IMP and using the tenure variable expressed in years. When tests are performed 
on the data of the entire sample CEO prior employment is significant at α<.05, except 
when IMP is measured in relative values and the CEO tenure is measured in years. Overall, 
this means that when the decision not to impair is taken into account and the model 
controls for the association of CFO properties, the association between the CEO tenure and 
the magnitude of impairment charges is positive. Furthermore, compared to CEOs hired 
from outside the company, CEOs hired from inside the company are associated with higher 
impairment charges. Thus, H1 and H2 were proven to be false for the entire sample. 
 
In the subsample, the association between the CEO tenure and the magnitude of 
impairment charges is significant at α<.05, except for when IMP is measured in absolute 
values and tenures are measured in years. The association with CEO prior employment is 
not significant within the subsample. As such, H1 has proven to be false within the 
subsample, and validity of H2 has not been established. 
 
The association between CFO tenure and the magnitude of impairment charges when 
controlled for the associations of CEO properties, remains insignificant at α<.05 in all 
cases. The validity of H3 thus is not established. Furthermore, the association between the 
magnitude of impairment charges and CFO prior employment is insignificant when 
analyzing the data of the entire sample. However, within the subsample, CFO prior tenure 
association is significant at α<.05, when impairment charge is measured in absolute values, 
regardless of the definition of tenure. The absolute size of goodwill impairment charges is 
positively associated with a CFO being promoted from inside, when the decisions not to 
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take goodwill impairment losses is disregarded. H4 is thus proven to be false within the 
subsample. H4 validity has not been established for the entire sample. These findings are 
summarized in table 3. 
 
Table 5 Regression outcomes controlled for both types of executives 
 
7. Analysis of the outcomes 
The first question I ask myself based on the outcomes of my study, is: why would 
impairment charges increase during the course of employment of a CEO? More specifically, 
what incentives could there be for managers to want to increase impairment charges late, 
instead of early, in their tenure? An alternative explanation to wanting to take earnings 
baths early in their tenure, could be the job security argument. Contrary to the arguments 
behind my hypotheses, it is conceivable that CEOs might want to show good results 
(immediately) after their appointment and would want to avoid ‘unnecessary’ losses, to 
justify their appointment and secure their position. This desire might even induce ‘upward 
earnings management’. CEOs, who have acquired ‘relational goodwill’ for their positive 
performance throughout the course of their tenure, could also believe that this would be 
sufficient to mitigate any harm to their reputation from losses taken in later stages of their 
tenure, and thus would take these losses easier than ‘younger’ CEOs. 
 
Furthermore, the influence of CEO employment contracts and compensation schemes, 
which is not taken into account in this study, could have alternative explanatory power for 
the established association between the magnitude of impairment charges and CEO tenure. 
These contracts and payment schemes are usually constructed (in line with the agency 
theory) in such way as to align management incentives with company’s/shareholders best 
interests. Presuming that earnings management is motivated by management self-interest 
and that employment contracts are constructed effectively, this should lead to a reduction 
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of earnings management. Similarly, Beatty and Weber (2005) found that managers who are 
subject to more binding ‘contracts that include effects of accounting changes…will prefer 
to delay expense recognition’. Including executive compensation (plans) into a research 
model could be a consideration for future research. 
 
The second question that I ask myself is: why do the outcomes of my study indicate that 
internally promoted CEOs impair relatively more than CEOs hired from outside the 
company? First of all, it is important to note that the majority (69%) of CEOs whose data 
were included in this study, where classified as internal hires. This fact, by itself, might 
have a distortive effect on the outcomes of the study. 
 
Additionally, perhaps when it comes to employment history, the magnitude of the goodwill 
impairment charges is not best explained by the duration of CEO prior employment by the 
same company before his appointment. Reconsidering my prior hypothesis, I believe that 
the assumption that a manager becomes personally involved in prior acquisition due to his 
mere presence in the same company, might be too general. Instead, entrenchment could 
better be defined by the fact whether the manager in question was actually involved in the 
decision process that preceded a specific acquisition. Some support for this idea was also 
found in Beatty and Weber’s study (2005), which linked the likelihood of a SFAS 142 
impairment to the likelihood of a CEO making ‘the original acquisition’. Again, future 
studies can inquire to the feasibility of researching prior employment from this angle. 
 
An alternative explanation could also be that the prior employment of an executive could 
represent experience and knowledge. An executive, who has been with the same company 
for a longer period of time, is likely to have specific inside knowledge that would allow 
him to make a better judgment about the value of goodwill, and in turn might make it 
‘easier’ to take an impairment charge compared to a counterpart who lacks similar 
experience and knowledge. This could result in the observed relationship between prior 
employment and the size of impairment charges. 
 
Thirdly, I ask myself what other issues there might be that might have influenced or limit 
the outcomes of my study. First, there is the fact that contrary to most of prior research 
that has been done on the subject of goodwill impairment and/or the influence of CEO 
properties (which often have been performed in the United States), my study is aimed at 
European companies. For example, this could account for the existence of cultural 
differences between my and the prior research. Perhaps, the European context and 
tradition with regard to expectations and the regulation of executive behavior, contribute 
to a less competitive executive environment, which results in less opportunistic behavior. 
 
Furthermore, there could be other issues with regard to the chosen sample. For instance 
there is a noticeable presence of former state owned companies in my sample. As such the 
oil & gas and the telecommunication sectors combined, account for almost a quarter of the 
companies in the sample. One can speculate whether these companies are subject to a 
specific kind of (government-like) corporate culture, which most probably does not exist in 
the American context. These companies might also still be subject to governmental 
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influence and specific regulation, which would reduce the amount of discretion available 
to managers. 
 
In addition, the descriptive statistics reveal that that the telecommunications industry 
accounts for the largest goodwill impairment losses observed within my sample. It is a 
commonly known fact that during the observed period companies in that particular 
industry underwent several economic adversities, such as the devaluation of purchased 
UMTS frequencies. The heterogeneity problem surfaces with regard to this issue. It is 
possible that there were real economic causes to the impairment losses taken in the 
telecommunications industry. As these are the most significant impairment losses within 
my sample, this could undermine the validity of the detected relationship between 
impairment charges and CEO properties. To control for this problem, I ran an additional 
regressions, which included both CEO and CFO properties, on my data, while removing the 
entire telecommunication sector. The association between both absolute and relative 
impairment charges, and CEO tenure remained significant at α < .05 (also, when the 
decision not to take impairment charges was disregarded). However, the fit of the model 
measured in R2, decreased significantly to levels lower than 0.10. The CEO prior 
employment variables and both CFO variables were insignificant. 
 
The heterogeneity problem could be addressed through the expansion of the sample and 
the amount of observations. These are of course the obvious limitations of my study, as it 
does cover only two years worth of financial data of a limited number of companies. This is 
an inherent consequence of the nature of the intensive data hand-collection process with 
regard to the information about CEO tenure and prior employment in the European 
context. Furthermore, the sample could be expanded with regard to the amount of 
companies in it. A matter for future research is to consider an entire different sample of 
companies, or consider including financial institutions in the sample. 
 
Finally, based on my own analysis of reporting standards with regard to goodwill 
impairment and predictions formed in prior research about the susceptibility of goodwill 
impairment testing to managerial discretion, I formed expectations about goodwill 
impairment charges to be a likely item to be used for earnings management. This 
assumption can also be a subject for critical review. It could be a subject to future 
research to consider to what degree it is really likely that goodwill impairment test is used 
as a ‘tool’ to manage earnings. Perhaps, other ‘gaps’ in financial reporting standards are 
used relatively more often to manage earnings (on a larger scale), and these ‘earnings 
management tools’ could also be tested for association with executive tenure and 
employment information.  
 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
The outcomes of this study indicate that the tenure and prior employment of the CEO are 
significantly associated with a company’s financial reporting behavior in relation to the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment. Contrary to my expectations I have found that CEO 
tenure is positively associated with the magnitude of goodwill impairment charges. These 
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results mean that the hypothesis that CEOs tend to take earnings baths in the early stages of 
their tenure, so losses can more easily be blamed on their predecessors, is false for the data 
in my sample. Surprisingly, this outcome contradicts the association described in the prior 
research such as Moore (1973), DeAngelo (1987), Pourciau (1993), Francis e.a. (1996), 
Lapointe (2005), Ramanna and Watts (2007), Zang (2008), Bengtsson e.a. (2007), Masters-
Stout e.a. (2007). 
 
Additionally, compared to CEOs hired from outside the company, internally hired CEOs 
correspond with lager goodwill impairment charges. This falsifies the second type of 
hypotheses of my thesis that compared to their counterparts, internally hired executives 
would impair goodwill by smaller amounts, as they are more ‘personally invested’ in 
previously taken strategic acquisition decisions, and thus would lack a ‘fresh perspective’. 
This outcome is less surprising as the results of prior research on this topic were 
inconclusive (Pourciau 1993, Bengtsson e.a. 2007, Masters-Stout e.a. 2007). 
 
Contrary to my expectation, I have not established a significant association between the CFO 
tenure and prior employment variables and the magnitude of impairment charges. At best, I 
can say that, if the decision not to take impairment charges is disregarded and only the data 
of the remaining subsamples is tested, CFO prior employment is significantly associated with 
the magnitude of impairment charges. Within the subsample compared to CFOs hired from 
outside the company, internally hired CFOs are associated with larger impairment amounts. 
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Appendix: companies in the sample 
 
Company 
Name: 
Ceo Name: Ceo 
appointment 
year: 
Ceo prior 
employment:
Cfo Name: Cfo 
appointment 
year: 
Cfo prior 
employment:
Arcelor Mittal Lakshmi N. 
Mittal 
1989 inside Aditya 
Mittal 
2004 inside 
A.P. Moller - 
Maersk 
Jess 
Søderberg 
1994 inside Søren 
Thorup 
Sørensen 
2006 outside 
Air Liquide Benoît Potier 2001 inside John Glen 2001 outside 
Anglo American Tony Trahar 2000 outside René 
Médori 
2005 outside 
Astra Zeneca David Brennan 2005 inside Jon 
Symonds 
2005 outside 
BASF Jürgen 
Hambrecht 
2003 inside Kurt Bock 2003 inside 
Bayer AG Werner 
Wenning 
2002 inside Klaus Kühn 2002 inside 
BG Group Frank 
Chapman  
2000 inside Ashley 
Almanza   
2002 inside 
BHP Billiton Chip 
Goodyear 
2003 inside Alex 
Vanselow 
2006 inside 
BMW Group Norbert 
Reithofer 
2006 inside Stefan 
Krause 
2002 inside 
BP John Browne 1995 inside Byron 
Grote 
2002 inside 
British 
American 
Tobacco 
Paul Adams 2004 inside Paul 
Rayner 
2002 inside 
Carrefour José Luis 
Durán  
1990 inside Eric Reiss 2005 inside 
Danone Franck Riboud 2006 inside Antoine 
Giscard 
d’Estaing 
2005 outside 
Deutsche Post Klaus 
Zumwinkel  
1990 outside Edgar Ernst 1995 inside 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
René 
Obermann 
2006 inside Karl-
Gerhard 
Eick 
2004 inside 
Diageo Paul Walsh 2000 inside Nick Rose 1999 inside 
EADS Noël Forgeard 2005 inside Hans Peter 
Ring 
2002 outside 
Electricite de 
France (EDF) 
Pierre 
Gadonneix 
2004 outside Daniel 
Camus 
2002 outside 
Endesa Rafael 
Miranda 
Robredo 
1997 outside Jose Luis 
Palomo 
Alvarez 
1991 inside 
Enel Fulvio Conti 2005 inside Claudio 
Machetti 
2005 inside 
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Ericsson Carl-Henric 
Svanberg 
2003 outside Karl-Henrik 
Sundstroem 
2003 inside 
Company 
Name: 
Ceo Name: Ceo 
appointment 
year: 
Ceo prior 
employment:
Cfo Name: Cfo 
appointment 
year: 
Cfo prior 
employment:
ENI Paolo Scaroni 2005 outside Marco 
Mangiagalli 
2001 inside 
France Telecom Didier 
Lombard 
2005 inside Philippe 
Jeunet 
2000 inside 
GlaxoSmithKline  Jean-Pierre 
Garnier 
2000 inside Julian 
Heslop 
2005 inside 
Iberdrola José Ignacio 
Sanchez Galán 
2001 outside José Sáinz 
Armada 
2002 outside 
InBev Carlos Brito 2004 inside Felipe 
Dutra 
2005 inside 
Inditex Pablo Isla 
Álvarez de 
Tejera  
2005 outside Antonio 
Rubio 
Merino   
2006 inside 
L'Oreal Jean-Paul 
Agon 
2005 outside Christian 
Mulliez 
2003 outside 
LVMH Bernard 
Arnault  
1989 inside Jean-
Jacques 
Guiony 
2004 outside 
National Grid Roger Urwin 2001 inside Steve 
Lucas 
2002 inside 
Nestlé Peter 
Brabeck-
Letmathe 
1997 inside Paul 
Polman 
2006 outside 
Nokia Olli-Pekka 
Kallasvuo 
2006 inside Richard A. 
Simonson 
2004 inside 
Novartis Daniel Vasella 1999 inside Raymund 
Breu 
1996 inside 
Reckitt 
Benckinser 
Bart Becht 1995 inside Colin Day 2000 outside 
Repsol Antonio 
Brufau Niubó 
1997 outside Fernando 
Ramírez 
Mazarredo 
2006 outside 
Rio Tinto Tom Albanese 2006 inside Guy Elliott 2002 inside 
Roche Group Ranz Humer 1998 inside Erich 
Hunziker 
2001 outside 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
Jeroen van 
der Veer 
1997 inside Peter Voser 2005 outside 
Royal KPN A.J. 
Scheepbouwer  
2001 inside M.H.M. 
Smits 
2004 outside 
Royal Phillips 
Electronics 
Gerard 
Kleisterlee 
2001 inside Pierre-Jean 
Sivignon 
2005 outside 
RWE Harry Roels 2003 outside Klaus 
Sturany 
1999 outside 
SAB-Miller Graham 
Mackay  
1999 inside Malcolm 
Wyman 
2001 inside 
Saint-Gobain Pierre-André 2005 inside Benoît 2005 inside 
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de Chalendar Bazin 
Company 
Name: 
Ceo Name: Ceo 
appointment 
year: 
Ceo prior 
employment:
Cfo Name: Cfo 
appointment 
year: 
Cfo prior 
employment:
Sanofi-Aventis Jean-Francois 
Dehecq 
1999 inside Jean-
Claude 
Leroy  
2004 inside 
Suez Gérard 
Mestrallet 
2001 inside Philippe 
Jeunet 
2000 inside 
Telecom Italia Riccardo 
Ruggiero  
2002 outside Enrico 
Parazzini  
2001 outside 
Telefonica Cesar Alierta 2000 inside Santiago 
Fernández 
Valbuen  
2002 inside 
Telia Sonera Anders Igel 2002 outside Kim 
Ignatius 
2000 outside 
Tesco Terry Leahy 1997 inside Andrew 
Higginson 
1997 outside 
Total Thierry 
Desmarest 
1995 inside Robert 
Castaigne 
1994 inside 
Unilever Patrick 
Cescau 
2005 inside Rudy 
Markham 
2000 inside 
Vivendi Jean-Bernard 
Lévy  
2005 inside Jacques 
Espinasse 
2002 outside 
Vodafone Arun Sarin 2003 inside Andy 
Halford 
2005 inside 
Volkswagen Bernd 
Pischetsrieder 
2002 inside Hans Dieter 
Pötsch  
2003 outside 
Xstrata Mick Davis 2001 outside Trevor Reid 2002 outside 
 
 
 
 
